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I. INTRODUCTION
A. The History of Leafleting in America
The distribution of leaflets, commonly known as handbills or pamphlets, has
a long history in the United States.' Uninvited dissemination of ideas through
personal solicitation at private homes has been utilized even longer.2
Dissemination of information before and during the American Revolution,
particularly through leafleting, played a major role in solidifying popular support
for breaking with the British Empire.' Some of the most important documents in
early American history, including The Federalist Papers and Thomas Paine's
Common Sense, were originally published as pamphlets under pseudonyms. The
writing of leaflets and pamphlets during colonial America was an important
profession, and as they were "inexpensive to print. . . , cheap to buy, easy to
read, and, more significant, easy to write," they became "the dominant vehicle of
propaganda and debate."'
The Supreme Court has declared that "[a]nonymous pamphlets, leaflets,
brochures and even books have played an important role in the progress of
mankind."6 The influence of leaflets in the formation of early America-
including influencing the formation of the United States Constitution, a move
towards a secular government, and launching the careers of founding fathers such
as Thomas Jefferson and Benjamin Franklin-shows that the Court's finding was
not merely hyperbole. Due to the rise of newspapers, magazines, books, and
most recently, the Internet, we no longer live in the "age of the pamphlet."
However, leafleting, both anonymous and in-person, continues to play a
prominent role in contemporary America.'
Although modern-day leaflets do not and probably will not have the same
historical impact of early American leaflets, they nonetheless maintain an
important function. People use leaflets today for a variety of purposes, including
advertising local businesses, soliciting votes for political candidates, spreading
religious ideas, sharing information about upcoming concerts and other events,
and informing local citizens what the local deli offers on its take-out menu (not to
1. Stephen Durden & David Ray, Litter or Literature: Does the First Amendment Protect Littering of
Neighborhoods?, 26 STETSON L. REv. 837, 838 (1997).
2. Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 141 (1943) ("For centuries it has been a common practice
in this and other countries for persons not specifically invited to go from home to home and knock on doors or
ring doorbells to communicate ideas to the occupants . . . .").
3. See Durden & Ray, supra note 1, at 837 ("Our country owes its very origin to pamphleteers such as
Thomas Paine, whose writings helped engender a spirit of rebellion amongst the American colonists.").
4. Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 65 (1960); Durden & Ray, supra note 1, at 837.
5. LITERARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: HISTORY 131 (Robert E. Spiller et al. eds., 4th ed. 1974).
6. Talley, 362 U.S. at 64.
7. See generally LITERARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 5, at 131-45 (examining how
leaflets were used in early America).
8. SPILLER ET AL., supra note 5, at 145; see also Durden & Ray, supra note 1, at 837 ("More than 200
years later, pamphlet distributors still roam the streets of our cities and towns.").
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mention the all important buy-one-get-one-free coupon).9 While leaflets have
served, and continue to serve, an important function in our society, people often
do not want them. What happens to these unwanted leaflets? "Most often
[leaflets] are thrown onto the sidewalk, street[,] or gutter because there is no trash
can nearby,"'o which contributes to a municipality's litter problem.
B. Changing American Attitudes Towards Litter
Generally speaking, the term "litter" is a fairly recent concept." In 1892,
naturalist John Muir created the Sierra Club to help preserve nature's natural
beauty 2 and in the early twentieth century, President Theodore Roosevelt set
aside more federal land for protection than any other administration before him.
Despite these early efforts at conservation, up until the middle of the twentieth
century, Americans continued to litter "with little regard ... [for] its effects on
the environment." 4
Beginning in the 1960s, American attitudes towards the preservation of the
environment began to change. 5 During the Johnson administration, Lady Bird
Johnson encouraged the cleanup of litter as part of her "Beautify America"
campaign.16 In 1969, the Cuyahoga River fire had more impact on the American
attitude towards pollution than any prior conservation efforts." The fact a major
American river was so polluted that it caught fire brought environmental issues
into the national spotlight." The Nixon administration responded to public
concern about the environment by creating the Environmental Protection
Agency, and Congress subsequently passed other environmental reforms,
including the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act to fight pollution.'9 While
9. Durden & Ray, supra note 1, at 837, 839.
10. Letter from Martin J. Golden, Senator, N.Y. State Senate, to Richard Platkin, Counsel to the
Governor of N.Y. (July 21, 2003) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
11. STEVE SPACEK, THE AMERICAN STATE LITTER SCORECARD: A SOCIOPOLITICAL INQUIRY INTO
LITTERING AND THE RESPONSE ROLE OF 50 AMERICAN STATES 3 (Mar. 9, 2008), available at
http://ftp.dot.state.mn.us/adopt/files/AmericanStateLitterScorecard.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review)
("The American Public Works Association standardized the term litter in the 1950's [sic] to include
'garbage ... refuse ... and rubbish .. .' known later as a form of solid waste.").
12. TIMOTHY EGAN, THE BIG BURN: TEDDY ROOSEVELT & THE FIRE THAT SAVED AMERICA 31 (2009).
13. ERIN C. TRESNER, FACTORS AFFECTING STATES' RANKING ON THE 2007 FORBES LIST OF
AMERICA'S GREENEST STATES 7 (2009), available at http://ecommons.txstate.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi
?article=1295&context=arp (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) ("Between 1903 and 1909, Roosevelt
created a total of fifty-one wildlife refuges and five additional national parks.").
14. SPACEK, supra note 11, at 3.
15. See TRESNER, supra note 13, at 9 (noting that the publication of Rachel Carson's Silent Spring,
"which explored the effects of exposure to the pesticide DDT ... on humans, animals, and the environment,"
led to an independent commission to investigate her claims and "may have forever changed the way Americans
view their environment").
16. Id. at ll.
17. Jonathan H. Adler, Fables of the Cuyahoga: Reconstructing a History of Environmental Protection,
14 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. J. 89,90-91 (2002).
18. Id. at 91.
19. TRESNER, supra note 13, at 13.
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these government reforms battled pollution on a national level, the anti-littering
campaign took a more grassroots approach.
Keep America Beautiful (KAB) was founded in New York City in 1953 with
the goal of promoting "national cleanliness."2 KAB began running a series of
Public Service Announcements to remedy the country's littering problem during
the 1960s and 1970s, which culminated in one of the most successful and
recognizable campaigns in history-the "Crying Indian" commercial .
Subsequent research funded by KAB discovered the seven primary sources of
litter and helped awaken the public consciousness to the plague of litter. Thanks
to KAB, volunteers collected approximately sixty-five million pounds of litter in
2009.
C. Overview of this Comment
Part II of this Comment begins by reviewing important Supreme Court
decisions dealing with the right to leaflet, noting that in general, leafleting is
protected speech under the First Amendment. In Part III, this Comment explores
the circuit split with respect to leafleting, noting the reasoning behind each
court's decision, and concludes that the basis for the split is whether the
ordinances are narrowly tailored to serve a substantial governmental interest.
Next, Part IV of this Comment examines Supreme Court decisions on the
"narrowly tailored for a substantial governmental interest" prong in order to
determine whether municipalities may constitutionally defend existing
ordinances. Part V proposes ways that municipalities may defend their
ordinances in court based on circuit distinctions and cases analyzing the
"narrowly-tailored" concept. Part VI examines the adequate alternative channel
of communication prong. Finally, this Comment concludes that there are no
guaranteed ways to defend an anti-leafleting ordinance in court, but by adopting
certain strategies, a municipality may have more success than their counterparts
in the Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits.
20. KAB: A Beautiful History, http://www.kab.org/site/PageServer?pagename=kab-history (last visited
Feb. 15, 2010) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
21. Id. In the "Crying Indian" commercial, a Native American cries when a motorist throws a bag of
trash at his feet because he feels "a deep, abiding respect for the natural beauty that was once this country." To
watch the commercial, see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_R-FZsysQNw (last visited Mar. 7, 2010).
22. KAB: A Beautiful History, supra note 20. The seven primary sources of litter are: (1) pedestrians,
(2) motorists, (3) households, (4) commercial businesses, (5) construction sites, (6) uncovered vehicles, and (7)
loading/unloading operations. Seven Sources of Litter, http://tristatehomepage.com/search-fulltext?&nxd
id=4018 (last visited Feb. 15, 2010) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
23. Keep America Beautiful 2010 Fact Sheet, http://www.kab.org/site/DocServer/FactSheet
2010.pdf?doclD=4821 (last visited Feb. 15, 2010) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
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II. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF LEAFLETING GENERALLY
The Supreme Court has long recognized that the distribution of leaflets is
protected by the First Amendment's free speech prong -that "Congress shall
make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . . ."" In
Schneider v. New Jersey, the Court, deciding upon the constitutionality of various
ordinances that prohibited the distribution of leaflets to prevent litter, held that "a
municipality may enact regulations in the interest of the public safety, health,
welfare or convenience, [but] may not abridge the individual liberties secured by
the Constitution to those who wish to speak, write, print or circulate information
or opinion."2  The Court was "of opinion that the purpose to keep the streets
clean and of good appearance is insufficient to justify an ordinance which
prohibits a person rightfully on a public street from handing literature to one
willing to receive it." 27 Later Court decisions extended leafleting protections. In
Lovell v. City of Griffin, the Court denied the constitutionality of ordinances that
required a license to distribute leaflets.28 In Jamison v. Texas, the Court held that
municipalities cannot "prohibit the distribution of handbills in the pursuit of a
clearly religious activity merely because the handbills invite the purchase of
books for the improved understanding of the religion or because the handbills
seek ... to promote the raising of funds for religious purposes."29 And in Martin
v. City of Struthers, the Court held that the First Amendment allows the
distribution of leaflets to the homes of private citizens.30
Although the Court has recognized a broad right to distribute leaflets, that
right is not absolute.3 ' For example, in one case, the Court upheld a federal
statute32 prohibiting the placement of unstamped mail into residential or personal
24. Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 162 (1939)
25. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
26. Schneider, 308 U.S at 160.
27. Id. at 162.
28. 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938) ("Legislation of the type of the ordinance in question would restore the
system of license and censorship in its baldest form.").
29. 318 U.S. 413, 417 (1943).
30. See generally 319 U.S. 141, 142 (1943) (declaring unconstitutional an ordinance that prohibited
those distributing leaflets from "summon[ing] the inmate or inmates of any residence to the door for the
purposes of receiving such handbills"); see also Durden & Ray, supra note 1, at 839-40 (noting a brief history
of what the authors describe as "litter-ature").
31. See Durden & Ray, supra note 1, at 837 (listing the variety of forms of leafleting, including leaving
unrequested leaflets by placing them on private door handles, porches, or merely throwing them into the front
yards of private residences).
32. 18 U.S.C. § 1725 (2009).
Whoever knowingly and willfully deposits any mailable matter such as statements of accounts,
circulars, sale bills, or other like matter, on which no postage has been paid, in any latter box
established, approved, or accepted by the Postal Service for the receipt or delivery of mail matter on
any mail route with intent to avoid payment of lawful postage thereon, shall for each such offense be
fined under this title.
Id.
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mailboxes, noting that the statute did not infringe upon First Amendment rights."
Today, when determining the validity of restrictions on speech-such as the anti-
leafleting ordinances-the Court uses a three-part test to determine the
restrictions' constitutionality. A government may reasonably restrict the
distribution of leaflets if: (1) they are neutral as to the content of the restricted
speech, (2) are "narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest,"
and (3) "they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the
information."
III. THE EXISTING CIRCUIT SPLIT ON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ANTI-
LEAFLETING ON CAR WINDSHIELD ORDINANCES
Whether a municipality may constitutionally restrict the leafleting of car
windshields is currently undecided due to a circuit split; however, that has not
stopped cities, including Portland, Las Vegas, and Atlanta, from enacting these
ordinances.13 New York has even enacted a state-wide ban on the practice.
A. The Sixth Circuit
The Sixth Circuit is the only circuit that has upheld a city's ban on the
leafleting of vehicles on public streets.37 In 1952, the city council of Catlettsburg,
Kentucky, passed Catlettsburg City Ordinance § 113.05, entitled Placing Posters
on Vehicles.38 The ordinance states that:
It shall be unlawful for any person to place or deposit or in any manner
affix or cause to be placed or deposited or affixed to any automobile or
other vehicle or other automotive vehicle, any handbill, sign, poster,
advertisement, or notice of any kind whatsoever, unless he be the owner
thereof, or without first having secured in writing the consent of the
owner thereof.39
33. See U.S. Postal Service v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114 (upholding the
constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 1725).
34. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (citing Clark v. Community for Creative
Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)). Many Supreme Court cases explain the "time, place, and manner"
test. Ward is used in this Comment because I believe it is a good analysis of the test and because the Durden &
Ray article uses the Ward case, which was helpful in my research. See generally Durden & Ray, supra note I
(using Ward as the main case to explain the "time, place, and manner" test).
35. PORTLAND, OR., CITY CODE § 16.70.510 (1992); LAS VEGAS, NEV., MUN. CODE § 6.42.145 (1988);
ATLANTA, GA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 6-2 (2005).
36. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 375(b) (McKinney 2009).
37. See Jobe v. City of Catlettsburg, 409 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 2005) (upholding the Kentucky city's local
ordinance that banned the leafleting of vehicles).
38. Id. at 262-63.
39. CATLETTSBURG, KY., CODE § 113.05 (1952).
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In 2002, Leonard Jobe, head of the American Legion Post in Catlettsburg,
began placing leaflets for the American Legion under the windshield wipers of
cars parked on public property." The City of Catlettsburg (City), in response to
Jobe's leafleting, enforced the ordinance and fined him five hundred dollars.4 1
According to the mayor of Catlettsburg, Jobe was the first person the City had
enforced the ordinance against. While the mayor explained the city had a
"littering problem" and the ordinance was one of the means used to address it,42
the mayor also admitted "the ban on leaflets under car windshield wipers 'really
did not enhance' the City's anti-littering efforts."43 Jobe subsequently filed suit
against the City, arguing the ordinance violated his First Amendment right to free
speech." The district court upheld the City's ordinance and Jobe appealed to the
Sixth Circuit.45 The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling, holding that
Jobe's First Amendment rights were not violated because Catlettsburg's anti-
littering ordinance:
Represents a content-neutral restriction on the time, place and manner of
speech, because the law narrowly regulates the problems at hand . . . ,
because the law leaves open ample alternative avenues for distributing
leaflets in an inexpensive manner ... and because the law has much in
46
common with a ban on placing signs on utility poles.
When discussing the content-neutrality portion of the test, both Jobe and the
City agreed the ordinance did not "draw distinctions based on the topic of speech
at issue or the point of view of the speaker," nor did the ordinance have anything
"to do with content of the literature being distributed . . . ."47 Next, the Sixth
Circuit found the ordinance served two significant governmental interests: (1) the
prevention of litter and "visual blight," and (2) the interests of private citizens "in
40. Jobe, 409 F.3d at 263.
4 1. Id.
42. Id.
43. Petition for Writ of Certiorari for Plaintiff-Appellant, Jobe v. City of Catlettsburg, at 4, 126 S. Ct.
389 (Aug. 4, 2005) (No. 05-188), available at 2005 WL 1902124.
44. Jobe, 409 F.3d at 263.
45. Id.
46. Id. In the context of the First Amendment, content-neutral speech restrictions are those restrictions
that do not favor one viewpoint expressed in speech over another. Content-based speech restrictions, on the
other hand, are restrictions that draw distinctions between the viewpoints expressed and the speaker, and are
almost always unconstitutional unless they fall under a recognized First Amendment exception, such as
"fighting words," incitement, or obscenity. See generally Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942)
(examining the "fighting words" doctrine); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (examining restrictions
on speech that is likely to incite people to imminent illegal action); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973)
(laying out a three-part test to determine whether speech is "obscene" and can be regulated). Content-neutral
restrictions are viewed under the time, place, and manner test, and will be held constitutional if they "are
justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, . . . they are narrowly tailored to serve a
significant governmental interest, and ... they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the
information." Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
47. Jobe, 409 F.3d at 268.
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having their private property left alone by those who do not have permission to
use it."48 Finally, the court held that the ordinance was narrowly designed to
prevent the litter that resulted from the placement of leaflets on vehicles.49
In the court's analysis of the city's legitimate interest, it relied heavily on
Members of the City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent,so a
Supreme Court case that upheld a ban on the attachment of signs and posters to
city owned utility poles." The Sixth Circuit reasoned that "[i]f a city may ban
signs from utility poles due to the visual blight caused by them, it follows that a
city may ban the placement of leaflets and signs on privately owned cars."52 The
Catlettsburg ordinance prevented not only the litter placed on the cars
themselves, but also the subsequent litter that would fall from the cars'
windshields to the city's streets." Finally, the court held that the ban on placing
leaflets on car windshields left open numerous avenues for distributing
information, including approaching pedestrians and handing them leaflets,
waiting on the street or at a parking lot and asking those approaching their
vehicles if they wanted to accept the leaflet, going from door-to-door to offer
their literature to citizens, or mailing the leaflets to residents. 4 The Catlettsburg
City Code even expressly allowed for the distribution of leaflets "at private
residences if they are 'placed on a porch or securely fastened to prevent them
from being blown or scattered about.'"5
Ultimately, the Sixth Circuit found that placing leaflets on car windshields
was much more like littering-just like putting leaflets on someone's front lawn
or anyplace "not otherwise designed by intent or usage to receive and hold
literature distributed by others"-rather than simply distributing information to
the willing public.
B. The Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits
1. Horina v. Granite City
Donald Horina, a retired school teacher and born-again Christian from St.
Charles, Missouri, uses leaflets to tell others about his religious beliefs and "their
need to be born again." As part of his leafleting, Horina would frequently drive
across the Mississippi River to Granite City, Illinois, to distribute pro-life
48. Id.
49. Id. at 269.
50. 466 U.S. 789 (1984).
51. Jobe, 409 F.3d at 269-70.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 270.
54. Id.
55. Id. (quoting language from Catlettsburg City Code § 113.03).
56. Id. at 273-74.
57. Horina v. Granite City, 538 F.3d 624, 627 (7th Cir. 2009).
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literature on car windshields parked near an abortion clinic.8 A security guard at
the clinic twice asked Horina to stop leafleting his vehicle, but Horina continued
to do soi. The security guard then contacted local police, and Horina was cited
for violating Granite City Municipal Code section 5.78.020, which stated that
"[n]o person shall deposit or throw any handbill in or upon any vehicle. It is not
unlawful for a person to handout or distribute a handbill to any occupant of a
vehicle who is willing to accept it."60 Approximately two years later, Horina filed
suit against the City alleging the ordinance violated his First Amendment right to
free speech as it was an "unreasonable restriction[] on the time, place, and
manner in which he could place handbills on automobile windshields . . . ." The
district court ruled in favor of Horina, enjoining the City from enforcing its
leafleting ban while also noting the City failed to show any evidence the
ordinance resulted in any reduction of litter in the City. 62 On appeal, the Seventh
Circuit affirmed, holding the ordinance unconstitutional.
The City failed to meet its burden of showing that the ban served a
substantial government interest because it did not demonstrate that the ordinance
actually resulted in a decrease in litter. 4 But even if it had, according to the
Seventh Circuit, the ordinance was neither narrowly tailored nor did it leave open
sufficient alternative opportunities for Horina to spread his message. The court
found that the ban was not narrowly tailored because the City had other
ordinances that dealt exclusively with litter and could fight its litter problem
without the broad ban on leafleting.' The court cited Schneider v. New Jersey,6
and suggested that a more obvious method of reducing litter was by punishing
'those who actually throw papers on the streets."' 6  Additionally, the Seventh
Circuit held that the alternate forms of communication put forth by the City-
distributing leaflets from person-to-person by waiting at parked cars, walking
door-to-door, or by mail-were not feasible due to the increased time and cost a
68leafleter would incur in disseminating his or her information.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. GRANITE CITY, ILL., MUN. CODE § 5.78.020 (2005); Horina, 538 F.3d at 627.
61. Horina, 538 F.3d at 628.
62. Id. at 629.
63. See id. at 636 ("As such, the Ordinance cannot survive constitutional scrutiny.").
64. Granite City relied on a "common sense" argument that leafleting causes litter and also pointed to
the fact that other municipalities had passed similar laws as proof that the ordinances led to a decrease in
littering. Id. at 633-34.
65. Id. at 635.
66. 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
67. Horina, 538 F.3d at 635 (quoting Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 162-63 (1939)).
68. Id. at 636.
455
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2. Krantz v. Fort Smith
The Twentieth Century Holiness Tabernacle Church believes it is its duty "to
'preach the gospel to every living person on earth."' 69 In order to spread its
religious message, the Arkansas Church placed leaflets under the windshield
wipers of unoccupied vehicles in nearby cities and towns.o While distributing
their leaflets throughout Arkansan towns , the Church's members were allegedly
arrested and threatened with other punishment for violating the local ordinances
banning the distribution of leaflets on parked cars.72 The ordinance for the City of
Van Buren, almost identical in wording to the other cities' ordinances at issue,"
stated:
It shall be unlawful for any person to place or deposit any commercial or
non-commercial handbill or other hand-distributed advertisement upon
any vehicle not his own, or in his possession, upon any public street,
highway, sidewalk, road, [or] alley within the City of Van Buren,
providing, however, that it shall not be unlawful upon any such street or
other public place for a person to hand out and distribute ... any handbill
to any occupant of the vehicle that is willing to accept it.7 4
The Plaintiffs filed suit alleging that the Cities' ordinances were
unconstitutional as overly-broad restrictions on the right to distribute religious
material.7 ' The district court, while noting that the ordinances may "have some
impact on expressive conduct," ruled in favor of the Cities, holding that the anti-
leafleting ordinances satisfied the time, place, and manner restrictions on public
speech.
On appeal by the Church, the Eighth Circuit reversed. The court found the
Cities' statutes to be unconstitutional because "the ordinances [were] not
narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest."" Here, the court
reasoned the ordinances suppressed more speech than was reasonably necessary
to serve the Cities' interest of preventing litter on the streets.79 The Cities did not,
or were unable to, present evidence establishing the indiscriminate placement of
69. Krantz v. City of Fort Smith, 160 F.3d 1214, 1215-16 (8th Cir. 1998).
70. Id. at 1216.
71. The four defendants in the case were the cities of Fort Smith, Van Buren, Alma, and Dyer. Id. at
1215.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1216 n.3.
74. VAN BUREN, ARK., ORDINANCES No. 5-1983; Krantz, 160 F.3d at 1216.
75. Krantz, 160 F.3d at 1215.
76. Id. at 1216.
77. Id. at 1222.
78. Id. at 1219.
79. Id. at 1221. The court also made the assertion that most of those who are unwilling to receive the
leaflet would not throw it on the ground. Id.
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leaflets on parked cars contributed to litter in the Cities..1 Another factor that
weighed in the Eighth Circuit's decision was there was a much less restrictive
way to prevent the placement of unwanted leaflets on cars-vehicle owners
could place a "no solicitation" sign on their dashboards while parked." The court
noted that even had the Cities been able to present evidence showing a "cause-
and-effect relationship," the ordinances could still be unconstitutional. Further, it
explained that "a governmental restriction does not have to be the least restrictive
or least intrusive means of regulation," but that it must not "curtail substantially
more speech than is necessary to accomplish its purpose, which is precisely what
the ordinances do."82
3. Klein v. San Clemente
The Ninth Circuit is the most recent court to look at the constitutionality of
leafleting on parked cars." In June of 2007, Steve Klein and several like-minded
people distributed leaflets in San Clemente, California, espousing their views on
immigration policy." The group started handing their leaflets to passing
pedestrians, but they soon began placing their materials underneath the
windshield wipers on parked cars.8 ' Not long after, members of the San Clemente
Sheriff's Department approached the leafleters and informed them they were in
violation of San Clemente Municipal Code § 8.40.130,86 which stated:
No person shall throw or deposit any commercial or noncommercial
advertisement in or upon any vehicle. Provided, however, that it shall not
be unlawful in any public place for a person to hand out or distribute,
without charge to the receiver thereof, a non-commercial advertisement
to any occupant of a vehicle who is willing to accept it.87
When the police told the group that they would face fines for violating the
ordinance if they continued to leaflet the vehicles, the group stopped.88 Klein sued
the City, claiming the anti-litter ordinance violated his First Amendment right to
free speech.89 The district court found the City's ordinance to be a legitimate
80. See id. at 1221-22 ("[D]efendants have not established a factual basis for concluding that a cause-
and-effect relationship actually exists ... that impacts the health, safety, or aesthetic well-being of the defendant
cities.").
81. Id. at 1220.
82. Id. at 1222.
83. See Klein v. San Clemente, 2009 WL 3152381 (9th Cir. 2009) (noting that the decision was filed on
October 2, 2009).
84. Id. at *1.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. SAN CLEMENTE, CA., MUN. CODE § 8.40.130.
88. Klein, WL 3152381, at *1.
89. Id.
457
2011 / Vehicle Leafleting: Suggestions for Municipalities
restriction on speech as it was narrowly tailored to serve the City's significant
interest in reducing litter in the City, and it denied Klein's request for an
injunction." On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding the City's interests
were not "proven sufficiently weighty to justify the restrictions placed on Klein's
right to express his political views.""
Noting that a marginal reduction in the amount of litter would not constitute
a significant government interest when restricting First Amendment rights, the
Ninth Circuit held the City must prove "not only that vehicle leafleting can create
litter, but that it creates an abundance of litter significantly beyond the amount
the City already manages to clean up."92 Klein testified that the act of securing
the leaflets underneath windshield wipers generally prevented litter, but in any
case, no more than one or two leaflets out of every hundred distributed would fall
to the ground and contribute to the City's litter problem.93 The City did not
present any empirical evidence that leafleting substantially contributed to its litter
problem but argued that the language of the ordinance itself noted a significant
interest and goal. The court, however, rejected this argument, finding that "[t]he
title of an ordinance is not evidence of an actual problem."94 The court also found
no merit in the City's argument that the ordinance prevented the unauthorized use
of private property.95
As the question of whether these types of municipal ordinances are
constitutional remains unanswered by the Supreme Court, the question remains:
how can a city craft an ordinance similar to the ones above when the weight of
the circuit authority leads to the conclusion that these statutes, in their respective
factual scenarios, are unconstitutional?" The circuits are split over whether the
ordinances are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest.97
90. Id.
91. Id. at *2.
92. Id. at *4.
93. Id.
94. See id. ("Noticeably absent from the City's argument, however, is any claim that the type of
leafleting engaged in by Klein significantly increases the amount of litter in San Clemente.").
95. Id. at *5.
96. Compare Klein, WL 3152381 (finding the ordinance unconstitutional), and Horina v. Granite City,
538 F.3d 624 (7th Cir. 2008) (finding the ordinance unconstitutional), and Krantz v. City of Fort Smith, 160
F.3d 1214 (8th Cir. 1998) (finding the ordinance unconstitutional), with Jobe v. City of Catlettsburg, 409 F.3d
261 (finding the ordinance constitutional).
97. Compare Klein, WL 3152381 (finding the ordinance not narrowly tailored), and Horina, 538 F.3d
624 (finding the ordinance not narrowly tailored), and Krantz, 160 F.3d 1214 (finding the ordinance not
narrowly tailored), with Jobe, 409 F.3d 261 (finding the ordinance narrowly tailored).
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IV. THE "NARROWLY TAILORED TO SERVE A SUBSTANTIAL GOVERNMENTAL
INTEREST" STANDARD
A. Narrowly Tailored
In Ward v. Rock Against Racism," the Supreme Court gave a detailed
explanation of the "time, place, and manner" test used by courts reviewing First
Amendment free speech issues. The Court upheld a New York statute that set
guidelines for sound amplification at concerts, finding that the ordinance was
content neutral, narrowly tailored to serve a substantial governmental interest,
and that it provided sufficient alternatives channels of communication." In
discussing whether the ordinance was narrowly tailored, the Court rejected the
Court of Appeals' analysis that the ordinance was unconstitutional because there
were less restrictive means available for the City to control the noise problem."
The Court stated that the "less-restrictive-alternative analysis" was never part of
the "time, place, and manner" test, and noted that previous precedent "clearly
hold[s] that restrictions ... are not invalid 'simply because there is some
imaginable alternative that might be less burdensome on speech.""o' In
reaffirming this proposition, the Court held that the requirement that a restriction
be narrowly tailored "is satisfied 'so long as the ... regulation promotes a
substantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the
regulation.",1
0 2
The Court also noted, however, that any restrictions imposed must not
"burden substantially more speech than .. . necessary" to achieve the goals of the
restriction.'0 3 "A statute is narrowly tailored if it targets and eliminates no more
than the exact source of the 'evil' it seeks to remedy."' An ordinance that is not
"substantially broader than necessary" to effect the purpose of the restriction
should not be declared unconstitutional because a court finds "less-restrictive"
means for effecting that purpose.'os Additionally, a court should give deference to
a municipality's decision to impose restrictions that serve an appropriate
interest.' 6 Nonetheless, a court must consider whether the governmental interest
would not be as well-served if there was no regulation or restriction at all.' 7
98. 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
99. Id. at 803. Not unlike leafleting, the Court noted that "[miusic is one of the oldest forms of human
expression. From Plato's discourse in the Republic to the totalitarian state in our own times, rulers have known
its capacity to appeal to the intellect and the emotions, and have censored musical compositions to serve the
needs of the state." Id. at 790.
100. Id. at 797.
101. Id. (quoting United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985)).
102. Id. at 799 (quoting Albertini, 472 U.S. at 689).
103. Id.
104. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 485 (1988).
105. Ward, 487 U.S. at 800.
106. See id. (quoting Albertini, 472 U.S. at 689) ("'The validity of [time, place, or manner] regulations
[do] not turn on a judge's agreement with the most appropriate method for promoting significant government
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B. Substantial Government Interest
The Supreme Court has never expressly stated whether preventing litter and
visual blight is a significant governmental interest, but dicta from cases generally
implies that it is. 0 8 Both the Fourth'" and Eleventh"o Circuits have held that
preventing litter is a substantial government interest, and despite isolated state
courts holding otherwise, commentators generally agree."' Similarly, numerous
courts have concluded that maintaining the aesthetical beauty of a town or city is
a substantial governmental interest."' Thus, littering, its aesthetic effect on a
community, and the safety problems it may pose, are all substantial governmental
interests to be served by an anti-littering ordinance. In sum, there is disagreement
among circuits over whether these anti-littering ordinances are narrowly
tailored."' This Comment proposes ways for a municipality to defend its
ordinances, or alternatively, to draft ordinances that meet the narrowly tailored
requirement.
V. OPTIONS FOR CITIES THAT WISH TO DEFEND THEIR ANTI-LEAFLETING
ORDINANCES
Even though a majority of circuit courts have determined that ordinances
banning the distribution of leaflets on car windshields for the purpose of
preventing litter are unconstitutional because they are not narrowly tailored, 4
several options exist for municipalities to either defend their existing ordinances
or draft them in a more "narrowly tailored" fashion. These options include
presenting empirical data showing that leafleting has contributed to a city's
interests' or the degree to which those interest should be promoted.").
107. Durden & Ray, supra note 1, at 849.
108. See id. at 842 (noting that the dicta in City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789
(1984) and Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) indicates that "the prevention of litter is a substantial
governmental interest").
109. United States v. Crowthers, 456 F.2d 1074 (4th Cir. 1972).
110. Sciarrino v. City of Key West, 83 F.3d 364 (11th Cir. 1996).
111. Durden & Ray, supra note 1, at 843.
112. City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 805 ("It is well settled that the state
may legitimately exercise its police powers to advance esthetic values."); see also Curto v. City of Harper
Woods, 954 F.2d 1237, 1243 (6th Cir. 1992) (finding that addressing the aesthetic and safety concerns of a
community constitutes a legitimate interest); Chicago Observer, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 929 F.2d 325, 328 (7th
Cir. 1991) ("Cities may curtail visual clutter, for aesthetic and safety reasons."); One World Family Now v. City
and County of Honolulu, 76 F.3d 1009, 1013 (9th Cir. 1996) ("Cities have a substantial interest in protecting the
aesthetic appearance of their communities by 'avoiding visual clutter."').
113. See supra Part I1[ (discussing the circuit split).
114. Compare Jobe v. City of Catlettsburg, 409 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that the ordinance was
a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction on speech), with Klein v. City of San Clemente, WL 3152381,
at *9 (9th Cir. 2009) ("The record does not support the district court's conclusion that the City's anti-litter
ordinance was narrowly tailored . . . ."), and Horina v. Granite City, 538 F.3d 624, 634 (7th Cir. 2008) ("[T]he
Ordinance is not narrowly tailored."), and Krantz v. City of Fort Smith, 160 F.3d 1214, 1219 (8th Cir. 1998)
("[W]e hold as a matter of law that the ordinances are not narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental
interest.").
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littering problem"' and demonstrating that the leafleting ban is part of a
comprehensive plan to combat litter."6
A. Empirical Evidence that Leafleting Contributes to a Municipality's Litter
Problem
Probably the most important strategy in defending a municipality's anti-
leafleting ordinance is presenting concrete evidence that leafleting is contributing
to increased litter throughout the community. In the three circuits that declined to
uphold the validity of the challenged ordinances, the municipalities failed to offer
evidence showing that leafleting of car windshields actually led to increased litter
in the cities."' For example, in Klein, the only party to submit evidence on the
amount of litter caused by the leafleting, was Klein-and he was the one
distributing the leaflets."' To make a strong argument that its ordinance is
narrowly tailored, a city should thus provide some evidence to prove that the
restricted activity contributes to a problem the city seeks to remedy."9 To
paraphrase the Eight Circuit in Horina, the common sense notion that prohibiting
people from leaving leaflets on cars will lead to a reduction in litter is not
enough.' 20
This "nexus, "21 however, is not an incredibly hard showing to make.122 A city
does not "need to produce panoply of 'empirical studies, testimony, police
records, [or] reported injuries' . . . [as] less evidence might be sufficient ...
depending on the scope and context of the restriction." 23 At the same time, the
Ninth Circuit has made it clear that a municipality must prove that the leafleting
leads to more than a "marginal" amount of litter.124 Therefore, a city must offer
evidence that more than one or two of every hundred leaflets distributed ends up
littering the city.125
115. See infra Part V.A and accompanying text.
116. See infra Part V.B and accompanying text.
117. Klein, WL 3152381 at *4; Horina, 538 F.3d at 634; Krantz, 160 F.3d at 1221-22.
118. Klein, WL 3152381 at *4 (remarking that Klein admitted that if he failed to properly secure the
leaflets underneath the cars' windshields, no more than one or two leaflets out of every hundred would blow
away).
119. See id. at *3 ("[Mlerely invoking interests . .. is insufficient.").
120. Horina, 538 F.3d at 633.
121. Klein, WL 3152381 at *3.
122. See Horina, 538 F.3d at 633 (noting that a city does not need detailed studies for empirical
support).
123. Id. The proposition put forth by counsel for the City of Catlettsburg-that there is no litter problem
because Jobe was the only person who violated the ordinance during its over fifty year existence-seems
conclusory and I doubt it would make a compelling argument in court. Brief in Opposition at * 1, Jobe v. City of
Catlettsburg, 2005 WL 2083984 (2005) (No. 05-188).
124. Klein, WL 3152381 at *4.
125. Id. (finding that Klein's admissions did not "significantly increase the amount of litter in San
Clemente").
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A city does not need to prove, however, that the leaflet litter constitutes a
problem in and of itself-a city could also support its argument by presenting
evidence of the effects of that litter. For example, a city may inspect its sewers in
order to determine whether leaflets have entered into the system. A city that can
prove leaflet litter has entered a sewer system may forcefully argue that not only
does the ordinance prevent visual blight, but it also protects the safety of its
citizens. 2 6 New York City,'" which in many places still uses original plumbing
from the mid-nineteenth century, has seen its wastewater treatment plants
become backed up by chicken heads, pickles, and lumber, among other things.
These blockages can lead to devastating pollution of the City's water supply.128
While pickles and chicken heads may not be much of a threat to the modem city
or town, leaflets, when raining, can "turn to mulch[,] often clogging street drains
and causing flooding."' 29 Presenting this type of evidence before a court would
also make it easier to convince the courts that do not view prevention of litter as a
particularly substantial governmental interest that there is indeed a substantial
governmental interest in preventing leaflets from becoming litter.
B. The Anti-Leafleting Ordinance is Part of a Comprehensive Plan to Prevent
Litter
Another way to defend an anti-leafleting ordinance, most likely in
conjunction with empirical evidence, is to show a city enacted the ordinance as
part of a comprehensive plan to prevent litter. Acting alone, an ordinance
banning the leafleting of car windshields to prevent litter, while created with
good intentions, may be seen as an "unsupported conjecture."'3 In Metromedia,
Inc. v. City of San Diego,"' a plurality of the Supreme Court held that San
Diego's ordinance banning billboards but allowing certain types of on-site
advertising and other special types of billboards was unconstitutional.12 While
banning most billboards, the ordinance allowed for billboards that were erected
for governmental purposes, religious symbols, for-sale signs, political campaigns,
and on-site advertising, among other exceptions."' San Diego defended its
ordinance on the grounds that it served two substantial governmental interests-
126. See Charles Duhigg, As Sewers Fill, Waste Poisons Waterways, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2009, at Al
(reporting that although the Clean Water Act of 1972 provided money for cities to upgrade their sewage
systems to deal with increasing waste, many cities' systems remained "overwhelmed").
127. New York is the only state to have a state-wide law banning the leafleting of vehicle windshields.
N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 375(b) (McKinney 2009).
128. Duhigg, supra note 126, at Al (noting that over twenty million people become sick every year from
contact with untreated water).
129. Letter from Martin J. Golden, supra note 10.
130. Horina v. Granite City, 538 F.3d 624, 633 (7th Cir. 2008) (noting that an unsupported conjecture is
"verboten in the First Amendment context").
131. 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
132. Id. at 521.
133. Id. at 496.
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the aesthetic beauty of the city and a reduction in the hazard of distraction faced
by both pedestrians and drivers.'" However, the Court found the City's argument
unpersuasive because the exceptions contained in the ordinance allowed for some
unaesthetic and distracting signs while prohibiting others.' Unlike the anti-
leafleting ordinances at issue in the current circuit split,16 the plurality in
Metromedia, Inc. did not view the case as a total ban on billboard advertising.37
Justice Brennan's concurring opinion, however, did consider the ordinance to be
a total ban and concluded that "before deferring to a city's judgment, a court
must be convinced that the city is seriously and comprehensively addressing
aesthetic concerns with respect to its environment."l 38 Nevertheless, subsequent
decisions have made clear that although a comprehensive plan shows that a
municipality is serious about combating litter, such a plan is not necessary.3  But
assuming that courts will be more willing to uphold ordinances when a city's
ultimate goal is tied to a comprehensive plan, what can a city do to show they
have one?
First, cities drafting their anti-leafleting ordinances should not permit
exceptions to the leafleting of car windshields except where absolutely
necessary-for example, ticketing illegally parked cars. A municipality would be
wise to avoid language like that contained in the New York state ordinance,
which states that "[t]he use or placing of posters or stickers on windshields or
rear windows of motor vehicles other than authorized by the commissioner, is
hereby prohibited."'" Because New York allows leafleting of car windshields
when express approval of the traffic commissioner is given, it has a weaker
argument that the ordinance's design is the actual prevention of litter, as a Court
could find this exception to be similar to those exceptions in Metromedia, Inc. 141
Second, a municipality should be prepared to demonstrate that a leafleting
ban is not the only step it is taking to reduce litter.
134. Id. at 493.
135. Id. at 513.
136. See supra Part I and accompanying text (discussing the current circuit split).
137. Id. at 521-22.
138. Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 531 (plurality) (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment).
139. See Members of City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 811(1984) ("Even if
some visual blight remains, a partial, content-neutral ban may nevertheless enhance the City's appearance.").
But see Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 189 (1999) (holding that a statute
that prohibited commercial advertisements of gambling casinos in order to "alleviate the social costs of casino
gambling by limiting demand" was unconstitutional because of the counter-intuitive congressional aim of
promoting tribal casino gambling).
140. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 375(b) (McKinney 2009) (emphasis added).
141. See Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 496 (detailing the various exceptions to San Diego's billboard
ordinance).
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The following is a recommended, but by no means exclusive, list of
programs a municipality should be prepared to commit to if it wishes to show a
comprehensive plan:
(1) Municipalities could demonstrate participation in an "Adopt-A-
Highway" program. In the majority of surveys detailing the
effectiveness of these programs, only Mississippi showed an increase
in litter where the program was in place.'42
(2) A municipality should institute measures that do not just ameliorate
leaflet-type trash, but that also cut down on litter as a whole. For
example, studies show that the most widely littered items are
cigarette butts.14 1 Of all the people who throw their cigarette butts
onto the ground, twenty-three percent of these people did so because
there were no ashtrays nearby.'" A municipality can easily place
more ashtrays throughout the city, or require businesses to provide
them outside of their establishments. These measures would likely
have a low cost with a potentially high reduction in litter.
(3) Like a lack of ashtrays, a lack of normal trash receptacles, and even
the aesthetic quality of the receptacles, can contribute to the amount
of litter in a city.145 A municipality committed to providing more
trash cans will see a drop in litter,146 and doing something as simple
as covering these trash cans with a coat of paint will decrease the
litter rate.147 Increasing the number of trash cans in areas where in-
person leafleting is high would indicate to a court an attempt to
prevent all types of litter.
(4) A municipality should show that it is committed to enforcing existing
litter laws. Municipal police officers account for approximately
eighty-four percent of all litter related arrests.148 Because local
enforcement is the key to enforcing these laws, a municipality should
be prepared to levy fines and, if necessary, to secure convictions
against litterers. However, littering as a crime is tough to prosecute,
142. KEEP AMERICA BEAUTIFUL, LIrERATURE REVIEw-LTER: A REVIEW OF LITTER STUDIES,
ATTITUDE SURVEYS & OTHER LITTER-RELATED LITERATURE 3-5 (July 2007). Note, however, that
Mississippi's results may be skewed because adopted sites are more likely to be in "hot-spots" for litter. Id.
143. Id. at 6-4 (noting that cigarette butts make up 58% of all littered items). One Texas study concluded
that cigarette butts make up 28% of all visible litter. Id. at 8-2.
144. Id. at 6-4.
145. Id.at7-1.
146. Id. at 7-2.
147. See id. at 7-1 (finding that "attractive receptacles reduced litter by 14.7 percent, while... drums
showed an insignificant reduction of 3.2 percent").
148. Id. at 11-1.
464
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 42
and one 1971 study concluded that more than twelve percent of local
police forces fail to report convictions in any single year.149 This
leads citizens to conclude that the litter laws are not effective, and
that in fact, there is no punishment for littering.so
In sum, any municipality seeking to implement a car-windshield leafleting
ban, or defend the constitutionality of one, should: (1) determine the effect of
leaflet litter in the city and prepare empirical evidence on how it affects the
community,"' and (2) develop a comprehensive plan to combat all types of litter,
especially leafleting, so a court will be more inclined to determine that the
ordinance is narrowly tailored.15 2
VI. ADEQUATE ALTERNATIVE CHANNELS FOR COMMUNICATING
Once a municipality proves that its ordinance is narrowly tailored, it will
need to prove that there remain adequate alternative channels of
communication."' Courts dealing with this issue are split over whether
alternatives that are not as "economically feasible" as the prohibited conduct are
adequate alternative channels for communicating.'" Some scholars have
hypothesized that the Supreme Court's decisions on the issue would support an
anti-leafleting ordinance like the ones discussed above, as long as the ordinance
"does not affect any individual's right to speak and to lawfully distribute
literature in the same location where that person is otherwise prohibited from
littering with literature."
Based on the assumption that alternative channels of communication are
adequate-and notwithstanding the monetary cost of the speech-as long as the
person wishing to disseminate information is allowed to do so in the same
general location "-here, public streets-a municipality would have several ways
of demonstrating to a court that channels of communication remain open. The
presence of billboard space on public thoroughfares could be considered an
adequate alternative means of communication because a leafleter would have the
option, instead of printing out leaflets and reaching only those members of the
public who have parked their cars on public streets, to erect a stationary billboard
149. Id. at 7-1.
150. Id. ("A 1999 Florida study. .. found that 76 percent of respondents thought litter laws were
ineffective.").
151. See supra Part V.A and accompanying text (discussing that the courts involved in the circuit split
found this to be an extremely important factor).
152. See supra Part V.B and accompanying text (discussing ways in which a community may develop a
comprehensive plan to combat litter).
153. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 802 (1989).
154. Durden & Ray, supra note 1, at 855.
155. Id. at 835.
156. Id. at 855.
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which would reach many more viewers.17  Additionally, as long as the
municipality does not have other ordinances restricting person-to-person
leafleting on city streets where cars usually park, the ability of the leafleter to
hand out information to passersby would become another adequate alternative
channel of communication.'" While this prong of the "time, place, and manner"
test has been called "puzzling and difficult to apply,"'" it is unlikely that a
municipality would have difficulty applying it when defending its vehicular anti-
leafleting bans.W
VII. CONCLUSION
While American attitudes towards litter have changed dramatically over the
past century, litter continues to plague our cities. 6 ' Anti-leafleting ordinances
preventing the distribution of materials on car windshields can be an effective
tool to fight this source of litter. However, these ordinances must be carefully
crafted, and their benefits supported by the facts, in order to survive the
necessary constitutional scrutiny.62
While environmental protection is a noble goal, many Americans
understandably might more zealously guard their First Amendment rights.
Because these ordinances restrict speech, municipalities should carefully
examine the benefits of anti-leafleting laws before they decide anti-leafleting
statutes are what their city needs. Municipalities that decide to enact ordinances
that ban the leafleting of windshields would be wise to follow the suggested
steps-create a comprehensive plan to combat litter'63 and provide empirical
evidence of litter caused by vehicular leafleting'"-if they are going to defend
the ordinances against constitutional attack.
157. See Members of City of Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 820 (1984)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[Niot only must handbills be printed in large quantity, but many hours must be spent
distributing them. The average cost of communicating by handbill is . . . likely to be far higher than the average
cost of communicating by poster.")
158. See Carew-Reid v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 903 F.2d 914, 919 (2d Cir. 1990) ("The First
Amendment... does not guarantee appellees access to every or even the best channels or locations for their
expression.").
159. Durden & Ray, supra note 1, at 850.
160. See supra notes 157-58 and accompanying text (explaining ways a municipality could show that
alternative channels of communication exist).
161. See generally KEEP AMERICA BEAUTIFUL, LITERATURE REVIEw-LITER: A REVIEW OF LITrER
STUDIES, ATITUDE SURVEYS & OTHER LITTER-RELATED LITERATURE (July 2007) (examining the litter issue
from environmental, economic, and societal costs).
162. Supra Part V and accompanying text.
163. Supra Part V.B and accompanying text
164. Supra Part V.A and accompanying text.
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